スティグリッツ教授のコメントLessons from Japan's Economic Malaise

Project-syndicate org. (http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/PROJECT_SYNDICATE) に公表された3/12付スティグリッツ教授のコメントLessons from Japan's Economic Malaise。

このメモは明らかに読者に安倍首相を念頭において書かれている。最後には同じ問題に直面する諸国への貴重な教訓になるとまで書かれている。全文は末尾に掲げる。
安倍首相も悪い気はしていないはずだ。

デフレが如何に悪いかが説明された後に、日本は具体的に何をやるべきかが示される。

How can Japan's deflation be reversed? Assume that the Japanese government financed its deficit partly by printing money rather than borrowing. Some individuals and firms who receive this money might simply hold on to the newly minted yen, but others might choose to spend it on goods and services, thereby stimulating the economy. Similarly, higher deposits might simply add to some banks' excess liquidity, but others might find it attractive to lend more, providing a further economic boost.
A carefully paced program could add enough to aggregate demand to pick up the slack in the economy, and reverse deflation, setting into motion a virtuous cycle. Higher prices would make debtors better off, and they might as a result begin to spend more. More debtors would be able to repay their loans, which might lead the banks to lend more. Meanwhile, the yen would weaken, helping exports, and even if the real exchange rate did not change much, given Japan's position as a major creditor, the yen value of its foreign holdings would increase, providing still more economic stimulus.

日本のデフレはどのように元に戻せるだろうか。日本政府が財政赤字を紙幣の増刷でまかなうと想定してみよう（ここは、従来の日銀の財政赤字のファイナンスと見られてはいけないという主張と真っ向から反する）。この新たな金を受け取った個人や企業は預金を積み上げるかもしれないが、中には、物やサービスに使ってみようという者も出てくるかもしれない。それによって経済に刺激を与えるのである。同様に、預金が積み上がると単に銀行の過剰流動性が増すだけになるかもしれないが、中には、貸し出しを増やそうとする銀行もあるかもしれない。それによってさらに経済を後押しすることになる。
注意深く配慮された政策は全体の需要を引き上げ経済の低迷から脱し、デフレの流れを反転させ、好循環のサイクルに動かせることになる。価格の上昇は債務者の状況を改善し、その結果彼らは支出を増やすことになるかもしれない。債務者が債務返済を増やせば増やすほど、銀行はさらに貸し出しを増やそうとする。その間に円は外国通貨に比べ安価になり、輸出が促進され、さらに実質為替レートが大きく変わらなくとも、日本が大債権国であるという立場を考慮すれば、外貨資産の円表示による価値は増加し、更にいっそうの経済の刺激となる。

次に、懸念事項（インフレの高進、政府への信頼の揺らぎ）への回答とこの政策のもたらす意義についての段落を抜き出す。
インフレが高進する懸念について。

Of course, those infected with inflation paranoia might worry: won't such a policy simply lead to an inflationary spiral? There is no economic research that supports such worries. For countries with low to moderate inflation, moderate increases in inflation do not lead to runaway inflation, regardless of what central bankers may say on the matter.
To be sure, if Japan's government started printing money recklessly--as some countries have done in the past--such worries would be well grounded. But the Japanese government has shown a remarkable record of fiscal responsibility, and could even calibrate the fraction of the deficit financed by issuing money.

もちろん、インフレ・パラノイアに感染した人々は心配するだろう。そのような政策はインフレ・スパイラルをもたらすのでは、と。そのような心配を支持する経済的実証はない。低インフレから穏やかなインフレの諸国では、中央銀行家が何を言おうが、穏やかなインフレ率の上昇が手のつけられないインフレになることはない。
確かなことに、日本政府が不注意に紙幣の増刷を始めたならー過去にいくつかの国が行ったようにーそのような懸念はちゃんとした根拠があろう。しかし、日本政府はこれまで素晴らしい財政規律の実績を示してきており（！！！）、紙幣を増刷することによりまかなわれた財政赤字の一部を調整することさえ出来た（戦後のインフレ収束を指しているのか？）。

次に日本経済への信頼性が揺らぐことはないと述べる。

What would be the impact on confidence in the Japanese economy of such fiscal stimulus? There is nothing that undermines confidence in an economy so much as recessions; and there is nothing that undermines confidence in a government's ability to manage the economy so much as ongoing failure to address either the extremes of inflation or persistent stagnation.

そのような財政刺激が日本経済への信頼にどのような影響を与えるだろうか。景気後退ほど経済への信頼を弱めるものはない。過酷なインフレや長引く景気低迷を全然制御できないほど政府の経済管理能力への信頼を弱めるものはない。

そしてこの政策から得られる教訓が貴重なものとなると締めくくる。

Restoring growth would be good for Japan, good for Asia, and good for the world economy. Perhaps more importantly, the lessons gleaned from a policy of determined stimulus would be invaluable for other countries facing similar problems.

成長を回復することは日本にとっても良いことだし、アジアにとっても良いことだ。そして世界経済にとっても良いことだ。多分もっと重要なことは、断固とした刺激策から得られる教訓は同じような問題に直面する国々に評価できないほどの貴重なものとなることであろう。

Lessons from Japan's Economic Malaise
12 March 2003
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/lessons-from-japan-s-economic-malaise

Japan's economy has been in a state of malaise--slow growth alternating with recession--for over a decade, with intense debate meeting policy vacillation. Some, for instance, prescribe budget deficits to stimulate the economy; others, remembering the Clinton Administration's claim that fiscal consolidation underpinned the US recovery in 1993, argue for deficit reduction. Similarly, some argue that the country needs a mild dose of inflation, while Japan's central bank continues to resist the very idea that inflation could ameliorate any economic problem.
Confusion about what cure to prescribe is caused in part by the fact that different medicines are suited for different problems, whereas much of the policy debate fails to distinguish among them adequately. As one of President Clinton's economic advisers during the critical period of America's economic recovery, I feel obligated to point out that circumstances in the US in the early 1990's were unique.
Normally, deficit reduction in an economic downturn makes a downturn worse--just as the British economist John Maynard Keynes demonstrated 70 years ago. Indeed, thanks to the IMF, we have had ample opportunity to see what happens, both in East Asia and Latin America, when an economy in a downturn tries to balance its budget.
The reason deficit reduction worked in the US in 1993 was that America's banks, whose balance sheets were weak, had large holdings of long-term bonds, the value of which increased as long-term interest rates fell. The fall in interest rates, which spurred business investment, was in part due to the long-term deficit reduction strategy.
Today, Japan faces a problem of deflation, not inflation. During the Great Depression, the great American economist Irving Fisher focused on the adverse effects of falling prices. My own work, with Bruce Greenwald of Columbia University, updates these theories, taking into account the imperfections of capital markets, especially those associated with asymmetries of information.
Keynes worried about price rigidities--the failure of prices and wages to fall when there is excess supply of labor or goods. Keynes' colleague at Cambridge University, A.C. Pigou, voiced the standard theory of the time: if wages and prices fell sufficiently, then consumers with money would eventuallyfeel well enough off (given how cheap everything had become) that they would start to spend, rejuvenating the economy. Keynes famously retorted that in the long run we are all dead.
Fisher's criticism, however, was even more devastating--and more relevant to Japan's current circumstances: as prices fall, debtors, whose obligations are fixed in nominal terms (that is, in terms of yen) find it increasingly difficult to repay what they owe. In real terms, they are forced to pay back more and more to their creditors.
Some debtors default--the debtor problems then become the banks' problem--while others are forced to cut back their expenditures, deepening the downturn. Falling prices also mean that even when thenominal interest rate is very low, the real interest rate, taking into account the deflation, may be significantly higher, so investment, too, is discouraged. In short, falling prices worsen the economy's situation in the short run.
How can Japan's deflation be reversed? Assume that the Japanese government financed its deficit partly by printing money rather than borrowing. Some individuals and firms who receive this money might simply hold on to the newly minted yen, but others might choose to spend it on goods and services, thereby stimulating the economy. Similarly, higher deposits might simply add to some banks' excess liquidity, but others might find it attractive to lend more, providing a further economic boost.
A carefully paced program could add enough to aggregate demand to pick up the slack in the economy, and reverse deflation, setting into motion a virtuous cycle. Higher prices would make debtors better off, and they might as a result begin to spend more. More debtors would be able to repay their loans, which might lead the banks to lend more. Meanwhile, the yen would weaken, helping exports, and even if the real exchange rate did not change much, given Japan's position as a major creditor, the yen value of its foreign holdings would increase, providing still more economic stimulus.
Of course, those infected with inflation paranoia might worry: won't such a policy simply lead to an inflationary spiral? There is no economic research that supports such worries. For countries with low to moderate inflation, moderate increases in inflation do not lead to runaway inflation, regardless of what central bankers may say on the matter.
To be sure, if Japan's government started printing money recklessly--as some countries have done in the past--such worries would be well grounded. But the Japanese government has shown a remarkable record of fiscal responsibility, and could even calibrate the fraction of the deficit financed by issuing money.
What would be the impact on confidence in the Japanese economy of such fiscal stimulus? There is nothing that undermines confidence in an economy so much as recessions; and there is nothing that undermines confidence in a government's ability to manage the economy so much as ongoing failure to address either the extremes of inflation or persistent stagnation.
Restoring growth would be good for Japan, good for Asia, and good for the world economy. Perhaps more importantly, the lessons gleaned from a policy of determined stimulus would be invaluable for other countries facing similar problems.