ユーロの今後、「銀行同盟」「財政同盟」メルケル首相の決断
６/23/12 Economist
Angela’s vision
The promised land that lies ahead keeps receding into the distance
By Charlemagne
http://www.economist.com/node/21557371
Jun 23rd 2012 | from the print edition
Charlemagne（仮名）というコラムニストのユーロのこれからについて記事の引用と抄訳。
IN THESE times of tribulation for the euro, Germany offers a prophecy. One day, when the euro zone has got beyond the wilderness of austerity and structural reform, it will be rewarded with prosperity. Europe will have worked off its debt and become more competitive. Markets will see that the real problems of the world economy lie in debt-laden America and Japan.
The more the outside world criticises Germany, the more fervently senior German officials cling to this vision. Others have reason for doubt. In the third year of the euro crisis things are getting worse. Even good news brings no relief. Greece avoided the meltdown that an election victory by the anti-austerity Syriza party might have brought. But the new government of Antonis Samaras, leader of the centre-right New Democracy party, may not be able to halt Greece’s death spiral. An agreement to give Spain up to €100 billion ($127 billion) of euro-zone loans to recapitalise its banks did not stop the slide for long. Markets jumped at hints from the G20 summit that European rescue funds might start buying Spanish and Italian bonds, but for how long?
良いニュースがあってもそれは安心につながらない。（ギリシャの事はもうあきらめているようだ。）スペインの銀行支援の€100ビリオンも効果が薄かった。G20でのスペイン国債、イタリア国債の買い入れの話も、さてどれ程なのか。
All along the fundamental doubt remains. What stands behind the euro: Germany, the European Central Bank (ECB), or nothing at all? Investors in euro-zone bonds want to be sure they will be repaid, and in euros, not devalued drachmas, liras or pesetas. National currencies are backed by national treasuries with the power to tax and central banks with the power to print money. But the euro is a single currency without a single government, and the ECB cannot lend to sovereigns.
基本的な問題は初めからあった。ユーロの裏づけとなるのは、ドイツかECBか、それとも何もないのか。国の通貨は、徴税権を持った財務省と紙幣発行権を持った中央銀行によって裏付けられる。だが、ユーロは単一政府を有さない単一通貨なのである。しかも、ECBは国家主権への貸付は出来ない。
For Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, the answer is to show that the single currency is backed by the commitment of all members to budget discipline and structural reform. Cutting debt and boosting competitiveness will, in time, win back market confidence, she says. Quick-fix solutions are ephemeral and often counterproductive. The ECB’s €1 trillion of cheap loans for banks was soon exhausted. Fiscal stimulus only adds debt. Enlarging the euro zone’s rescue funds raises questions about the creditworthiness of even its most solid backers.
メルケル首相の回答はこうだ。単一通貨は、加盟諸国の財政規律と構造改革への強い関与により裏付けられている、と。債務の削減と競争力の拡大が市場の信任を獲得する。即効性のある解決策は、効果が一時的であってしばしば非生産的であると語る。確かに、€1トリオンの銀行向け低利融資はすぐに使い果たしてしまった。財政刺激策は、公的債務を増やしただけであった。ユーロ圏の支援ファンドの拡大は、最強の支援国の財務の健全性を疑わせた。
Almost everybody disdains quick fixes. But they favour other routes to the promised land. France and others want some mutualisation of liabilities: a “fiscal union” through joint Eurobonds to cut troubled countries’ borrowing costs, a “banking union” to be a joint backstop for the banks. Either of these (preferably backed by the ECB as lender of last resort) could create a European lifesaver to prevent weak sovereigns and weak banks from drowning each other.
他の人々は、約束の土地への他の道を好んでいる。フランスなどは、何らかの「負債の相互化」を望んでいる。「負債の相互化」とは、（問題国の借り入れコストを削減する）「€共同債」による「財政同盟」であり、銀行を支援する「銀行同盟」である。これらのいずれかが創設されれば（出来れば、ECBが最後の貸し手になれば）、弱い国家主権と弱い銀行が共倒れになることを阻止する救命者になるであろう。
The germ of a banking union is the most likely outcome of the European summit on June 28th and 29th. This is partly because Spanish banks are the biggest threat to the euro right now. The European Commission is already working on essential elements, such as a system to wind up failed banks. Banking integration presents fewer political and legal problems if banks (not taxpayers) pay into a European fund to provide deposit guarantees.
「銀行同盟」は、6/28，29のユーロ・サミットで検討されよう。これは、スペインの銀行がユーロへの最大の脅威であるからだ。銀行の統合は、他の方法より政治的、法的障害が少ない。
But that may not be enough to stop a Europe-wide run on banks by depositors who fear a currency break-up. Only the full power of sovereigns and central banks can do that. Germany is right to say that, in the end, banking union is the start of fiscal union. Germany may be strong, says Mrs Merkel, but not strong enough to stand behind trillions of euros’ worth of European debt. For her, market pressure is the best incentive for belated reforms. After all, it was the decade of cheap credit when financial markets barely distinguished between Greek and German bonds—behaving as if Eurobonds already existed—that created the imbalances that lie behind the crisis.
だが、それだけではユーロ圏に広がっている銀行取付を阻止するには不十分だ。国家主権と中央銀行の全権能が発揮されることが必要である。ドイツが次のように発言するのは正しい。「銀行同盟」は「財政同盟」の始まりである、と。結局のところ、この危機の背後にある不均衡を生み出したのは、金融市場がギリシア債とドイツ債の違いをほとんど認識しなかったここ10年間の安直な与信なのである。
Germany’s price for any mutualisation of liabilities is greater economic and political integration. Do Europeans want a banking union? Better to start with a strong European supervisor to stop the farce of national regulators applying stress tests that hide more than they reveal. Do Europeans want fiscal union? Well, first they should reduce debt levels, and get fit enough to keep up with Germany. In short, European countries must surrender much economic sovereignty before Germans will trust them to share their bank account. The Germans are already debating the future of the European project, including how to make it more democratically accountable. Others would be wise to think beyond just begging them for more unconditional support.
「債務の相互化」に対するドイツの対価（対価の意味は不明）は、今以上の経済と政治の統合である。ユーロ圏は「銀行同盟」を望んでいるか？まず、強力な統一された銀行監督機関から始めるのが良い。ユーロ圏は「財政同盟」を望んでいるか？まず最初に彼らは、債務の水準を減らしドイツ並みにしなければならない（高すぎるハードルに思える）。要するに、ユーロ諸国は、多くの経済主権を譲り渡さなければならない。
Time is running short
For the moment, Germany will provide no more than limited remedies that, at best, buy more time. There is much to be said for its belief in fiscal stability and reform, but playing for time may do more harm than good. The countries of the euro zone are not going through a normal adjustment. Their crisis is existential. Delay also raises the cost of salvaging the single currency (if Greece is to stay in the euro it will surely need yet another bail-out or debt-restructuring). Procrastination saps confidence in the euro. Loss of confidence, in turn, weakens growth in the core and deepens recession in the periphery.
今のところ、ドイツは時間稼ぎの救済しか行っていない。だがそれは、害の多いことである。危機は実在しているのである。遅れは単一通貨を救済するコストを膨らませる。もしギリシャをユーロ圏に留めるには、新たな救済と債務再編が必要となろう。引き伸ばしはユーロへの信任を失わせ、そのことが中核国の成長を低下させ、周縁国の不況を深刻化するだろう。
All this makes it harder for countries to balance their books, antagonises those who must endure austerity and exasperates those who must provide more credit. A chronic crisis, moreover, erodes citizens’ belief in the European project, and thus their readiness to accept the integration that is needed to save it.
このことは問題のある国の財政再建を困難にし、ユーロを救済するために必要な統合を受け入れることを難しくする。
Austerity and structural reforms will be of little help unless confidence returns. That requires an unequivocal, if limited, sharing of liabilities. The proposal by Germany’s council of economic advisers to pool part of the euro zone’s stock of debt is a good start. Mrs Merkel is understandably worried about the risks her country would be taking on. But if she does not show faith in the euro’s future, neither will the markets.
Economist.com/blogs/charlemagne
from the print edition | Europe
財政引き締めと構造改革はほとんど役に立たない。ドイツの経済アドバイザー委員会のユーロ圏の債務の一部を合算するという提案は、良いスタートとなろう。メルケル氏は、ドイツが負うリスクを心配しているのは理解できる。だが、彼女がユーロの将来に信念を持たなければ、市場もまた同じような反応で答えるだろう。
